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SPECIAL CONTRIBUTIONS

The Peculiarity of Per Curiam: In
the Georgia Supreme Court
by R. Perry Sentell, Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

On notable occasions, the format of a message acquires a heritage
equal in significance to the message itself. Because of its history,
familiarity, intrigue, or sheer repetition, an account's style of presentation may serve not only to characterize the account, but also to condition
its recipient to a pre-ordained demeanor of expectation. Style and
substance are thus comingled, and the medium subsumes the message.
It should come as no surprise that the described phenomenon claims
a special affinity to the law and to legal "messages." Much of the
information transmitted in law and in legal circles projects history,
familiarity, intrigue, and repetition, and its accounts bear highly
distinctive styles of communication. Pivotally dependent upon a process
of revelation, law defers to no other professional domain in its preoccu* Carter Professor of Law, University of Georgia (A.B., 1956; LL.B., 1958); Harvard
University (LL.M., 1961). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
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pation with definitive prerequisites of presentation.
The "legal
literature" of forms, reports, and assorted other prescribed species of
documentation assumes a medium of unparalleled significance.
One of the law's most unique styles of presentation is the per curiam
judicial opinion. When an appellate court reports its judgment in a case
via a per curiam opinion, it employs a format of legendary status.
Resoundingly rooted in history and popularly perpetuated by custom, the
per curiam opinion constitutes a fixture of jurisprudential communication. Few "forms" of legal literature are more familiar.
Upon closer examination, however, a second feature of this fixture also
provokes observation. Despite its air of comfortable familiarity, the per
curiam judicial opinion concurrently emits an aura of frustrating
imprecision. Among the disquieting aspects defying neat categorization
are the precise origins of the technique, its practical as opposed to
technical definition, possible prerequisites for its utilization, and both
the frequency and circumstances of its traditional invocation. How can
a format so familiar be at once so illusive?
II.

IN GENERAL

The reference sources leave much to be desired. As for origin, the
dictionaries recount only that "percuriam" derives from the Latin and
receives a literal English translation into the phrase, "by the court."1
That phrase "distinguish[es] an opinion of the whole court from an
opinion written by any one judge."2 Even this tentative sketch,
however, appears flawed. An "opinion of the whole court" is necessarily
written by some "one judge" on the court; thus, the proffered definition
falters at its inception.
Perhaps this difficulty accounts for the
alternative description: "[A] brief announcement of the disposition of a
case by [a] court not accompanied by a written opinion."3 From this
perspective, the distinction goes to the degree of elaboration with which
the court treats the case.
Another descriptive endeavor employs a bit more care: The term "per
curiam" "appears in opinions not attributed to any one member of the
court."4 Replacing the emphasis upon authorship, therefore, is the point
of attribution: The view expressed by the opinion is that of the court

1.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990).

2.

Id. "Sometimes it denotes an opinion written by the chiefjustice or presiding judge."

Id.
3.

Id.

4.

A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 125 (2d ed. 1995). "By the court is merely

an English translation of per curiam, a term that appears in opinions not attributed to any
one member of the court." Id. (emphasis in original).
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and not that of an individual judge. At the same time, this resource
cautions, "per curiam opinions should not be construed as exhibiting
greater unanimity among members of the court than a signed opinion
without a dissent."5 Although the attribution reflects no single judge,
therefore, neither does it imply particular agreement among the judges.6
Scholarship on the per curiam opinion is likewise largely lacking. An
earlier "critique" on the format's employment by the United States
Supreme Court described the device as "short, often one-sentence
statements of the result, with or without citation of authority."7 On the
one hand, the technique offers a "feasible means" of affording adjudication finality "to as many as possible of the numerous litigants who
demand it."' On the other hand, the Court's per curiam practice "has
given rise to a number of problems."9 The style's brevity of disposition
creates a pervading "uncertainty," which in turn bewilders litigants,' °
legislatures," and lower courts.' 2 Moreover, within the Court itself,
there appears disagreement
"as to which decisions ought to be accorded
13
summary treatment."

5. Id.
6. Id. The reference observes that the phrase's immediate future appears assured.
"Though it is a LATINISM, per curiam is a useful and well-established one: it is not likely
to be discarded any time soon." Id. at 126 (emphasis in original).
7. Note, Supreme Court Per Curiam Practice: A Critique, 69 HARV. L. REV. 707, 707
(1956).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 722.
10. Id. at 723. "It would seem that the Court might by rule provide a clear warning
to counsel that such results are likely to ensue." Id.
11. Id. at 722. "Legislatures may be unable to effectuate their policies because of
uncertainty as to the reason for the Court's decision." Id.
12. Id. "For the lower court judge the difficulty has centered principally around
uncertainty as to the scope of the Court's decision from the standpoint both of its meaning
and of its precedential effect." Id.
13. Id. at 723.
This disagreement raises problems of the extent to which the majority of the
Justices should yield to the desire of a minority to hear oral argument when the
case is appealable as of right; and generally of the desirability of reversing the
highest court of a state without hearing or opinion.
Id. The "critique" offered the following advice for reform:
Clarification of the meaning of per curiam decisions could be obtained without the
need for an increase in full opinions. In many cases confusion could be avoided
by the addition to the per curiam decision of a few sentences by way of explanation; by closer attention on the part of the Court to its citation of authority in per
curiam opinions, and by citation to specific pages of prior decisions; by a sentence
of explanation as to why a prior decision is regarded as controlling when this is
not readily apparent; and, finally, by occasional adoption of portions of the opinion

4
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A later review finds that the Supreme Court "has changed the use of
the per curiam label over time," rendering it difficult "to define what is
meant by a per curiam opinion." 14 For example, "[c]ounter to conventional understanding, . . . per curiams are not characteristically

consensus decisions."" As for the functions served by such opinions:
"They decide less controversial cases in a cost-effective manner; provide
prompt direction to lower courts to follow recent decisions; rapidly
answer obvious legal questions that, nonetheless, represent important

of the court below where that opinion is sufficiently in accord with the Justices'
views.
Id.
Other early references include Felix Frankfurter et al., The Business of the Supreme
Court at October Term, 1929, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1930):
Per curiam is appropriately used, presumably, only if the record (1) fails to raise
a federal question, (2) lacks in some technical prerequisite, like finality of
judgment below, (3) discloses an issue palpably frivolous or one lacking in
substantiality because controlled on the merits by settled doctrine .... But in
current practice, the authorities cited by the Court in its memoranda seldom
control the merits of the controversy. They are merely references to other cases
enforcing the jurisdictional postulate that the absence of a substantial federal
question in itself precludes jurisdiction. Such citations are at once needless and
confusing. Per curiams, like other decisions, serve a double purpose: as an
adjudication between the parties and as a pronouncement of law. They are guides
to the bar, to the lower courts, to the Supreme Court itself. If a per curiam
announces that a doctrine is no longer assailable, the public, the profession, and
the bench ought to be advised what the doctrine is.
Id. at 8-11 (citations omitted). See also Albert M. Sacks, Foreword: The Supreme Court,
1953 Term, 68 HARv. L. REV. 99 (1954):
The summary [per curiam] opinion is one of the various processes whereby the
Court seeks to assure that time and effort of the Justices are allocated in relation
to the importance and complexity of what is to be decided. As such, the summary
opinion has obvious utility in the efficient functioning of the Court, and there can
be no question of its propriety. There remains, however, the problem of its
appropriate use, and, more specifically, whether the Court is extending the use of
the summary opinion to cases where fuller exposition of views is warranted.
Id. at 99.
14. Stephen L. Wasby et al., The Per Curiam Opinion: Its Nature and Functions, 76
JUDICATURE 29, 38 (1992).
Use of a per curiam ruling rather than a signed opinion may indicate that a case
is considered routine or noncontroversial, at least to the majority deciding it. Or
a case may involve a case-specific, factual situation the Court feels it cannot
correct without explanation; the peculiar nature of the facts or procedures in the
case result in an unsigned opinion with less precedential effect than a fuller
signed opinion. A per curiam disposition may also be used to signal that the
outcome in the case is obvious and should receive prompt compliance ....
Id. at 36. The study also records a decrease in the Court's use of such opinions in recent
years. Id. at 33.
15. Id. at 38.
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Contrarily,
issues; and extend major decisions incrementally. "
expressed concerns include fears that the lack of full consideration may
lead to "bad decisions"; that per curiam opinions may provide poor
communication with lower courts; and that they convey inadequate
17
guidance to judges resistant to the Supreme Court's decisions.
Finally, the review laments that "remarkably little work has been done
s
to clarify [the per curiam opinion's] nature and uses.""
When the focus is retracted from the Supreme Court to other appellate
tribunals, the appraising literature reveals a striking stand off in
analytical assessments. One view grudgingly concedes the potential
value of the per curiam, but decries its deficiencies: "In its proper place,
[the per curiam] serves a legitimate purpose as a tool in the appellate
arsenal. But it can also be an evasive, if not an abusive device .... ""
Under this view, appellate courts commit serious error in extending the
per curiam opinion beyond the dictionary context when all the judges
concur on questions so clear as to require no explanation.2" Any other
utilization of the format runs counter to the precept of "public scrutiny":
It thus fosters judicial misconduct, defies evaluative appraisal, defeats
analytical jurisprudence, and forestalls legal advancement.2 ' When,
incredulously, a per curiam opinion and a dissent appear in the same
case, the result approaches folly: "It is not evident how a decision is 'by
the court' where part of the court disagrees with the decision and takes
In summary, "[t]he per curiam without
an opposing position."22
explanation represents government by edict, typical of a monarch of
whom no explanation may be asked, characteristic of the imperial
'ukase,"'23 and it "does not belong in a democracy."2 Finally, "[w]hat

16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 29.

The decision to use the per curiam label is made by the justices in conference.
This is unlike the situation in the federal courts of appeals, where the decision
whether to sign an opinion or to issue it per curiam is made by the judge assigned
to write the opinion.
Id. at 31.
19.

Tobias Weiss, What Price Per Curiam?, 39 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 23, 23 (1995).

20. Id. at 25. "The literal or dictionary meaning of the Latin phrase per curiam, 'by the
court,' offers little insight into the use of per curiam dispositions." Id.
21. Id. at 24. "The courts, as the servants of the people, must be amenable to public
scrutiny. For that purpose, judicial action must not only be open but must also be
explained. Anything less, offers the temptation of abuse, if not evasion." Id.
22. Id. at 27.
23. Id. at 30. "'Ukase' is defined in Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed.):
'In Russia, a published proclamation or imperial order, having the force of law."' Id. at 30
n.48 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2754 (2d ed. 1959)).

6
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price per curiam? As to the ukase per curiam, it is justice of impaired
quality, and a loss of respect for and confidence in the courts, with a
possible reaction outside the court system."25
At the other extreme, there is the position that signed judicial opinions
are "obsolete and counterproductive"26 and that the "intellectually
honest approach requires [the designation of] all opinions from
intermediate courts of appeal 'per curiam.'' 27 Under this view, the
identified judicial opinion constitutes an unhealthy manifestation: It
derives purely from "judicial ego," and its ramifications are "dysfunctional."2" In contrast, the per curiam opinion "is a part of the American
heritage from English law. It has its roots in that period of English law
when opinions were not only anonymous, but also sometimes represented
the feelings of only a majority of the court, with no dissent permitted."29 Thus, the English Privy Council announced each decision as
"the decision of the whole" and "every opinion was per curiam and
without dissent."3 In the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice
John Marshall instituted the issuance of "a single, collective opinion for
the entire Court," but then regrettably erred in determining to sign
those composite opinions.3 1 Supreme Court practice aside, "an unfortunate by-product of the personally ascribed opinion has been a deterioration in the institutional diligence on some courts of appeals, leaving the
judge who is assigned the opinion to write approximately as he or she

24. Id. at 30. "No agency of a democracy, the judiciary included, should be permitted
to act in that manner." Id.
25. Id. at 36.
26. Richard L. Nygaard, The MalignedPer Curiam: A FreshLook At An Old Colleague,
5 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 41, 41 (1996).
27. Id. at 50.
Appellate judges, however, must cooperate ... That is why it is such an anomaly
that an intermediate-appellate-court opinion, which speaks for the court, is
nonetheless signed and personalized by a judge simply because he or she was
assigned to write it. Often the result is that appellate judges think of "their"
opinions rather than opinions "by the court."
Id. at 41.
28. Id. "Opinions are the product of a consensus and should represent the composite
view of a court; they should not be the clone or scion of their authors." Id. at 43.
29. Id. at 43-44. "Publication of signed opinions, now an accepted and familiar
characteristic in American reporters, was not done in either the English or the American
courts when we declared our independence from England." Id. at 44.
30. Id. "Indeed, Council rules forbade anyone to reveal individual votes from the
conference. An opinion was that of the court, whether it was unanimous or decided by the
margin of one vote." Id.
31. Id. at 45. Marshall concluded that "by canvassing the views of the Justices and
issuing a single, collective opinion for the entire Court, the institution of the Court would
be enhanced." Id.
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pleases as long as the result represents the conference position. 3 2 The
prescribed remedy is obvious: "[T]he use of per curiam opinions by
intermediate courts of appeals would preempt the 'new lords, new laws'
approach to case analysis, make each opinion currency of equal value,
and curb the temptation to remap old territory merely because new
mapmakers, using the same old methods, have come along."3 3 Rather
than lower individual standards and personal accountability, "the per
curiam would inspire greater institutional responsibility."34 In summary, "Judge Per Curiam [should be elevated] to the well-deserved and
venerated status of a full-fledged and respected-and indeed the
predominant-colleague on intermediate courts of appeals."3 5
Although strikingly limited in scope, therefore, both dictionary and
scholarship reveal the settled but unsettling complexion of the per
curiam judicial opinion. Of Latin derivation, English translation, and
American adoption, the famous format both comforts and consternates.
Its status as a familiar convention of legal presentation is surpassed only
by its concurrent nature of confounding illusiveness.
In concept, the per curiam connotation suggests the predominating
qualities of oneness, unanimity, solidarity, anonymity, succinctness,
conclusiveness, brevity, agreement, approval, routine, simple, and
noncontroversial. Applied to a judicial opinion, those qualities manifest
a single, unanimous, unidentified announcement of the court's judgment-minus dissent or elaboration-in the relatively rare case viewed
by all the judges as indisputably controlled by a clear legal principle.
Conjecturally, this rarity might most likely occur when an appellate
court summarily affirms a lower court's decision, perhaps on a simple
procedural point, and in a noncriminal setting.
In practice, as the writers have evidenced, appellate courts employ the
per curiam opinion beyond its logical boundaries. Apparently unre-

32. Id.
33. Id. at 46. "The judgment of equal persons would be more readily acceptable if
pronounced in the name of the court, not a person on it." Id.
34. Id. at 49.
35. Id. at 50.
The most famous opinion-writer in the history of American courts, "PER
CURIAM," has gotten a bum rap. Per Curiam has been accused of writing the
opinions for the court, when out of cowardice others do not wish to. Per Curiam
has been accused of writing less-than-thorough explanations in simple affirmances. Per Curiam has been accused of being the handmaiden of law clerks ....
But I think the intellectually honest approach requires that we designate all
opinions from intermediate courts of appeal "per curiam." After all, they are
simply opinions by the court.
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strained by conceptual connotations, the courts utilize the technique in
contexts contraindicated by its predominating qualities, and they do so
far more frequently than those qualities would suggest. As a result, the
venerable format finds itself mired in confusion and suffused in
uncertainty. If its distinctive characteristics do not determine its
utilization, what are its generating circumstances? Do those circumstances hold constant over a term of years? How often is the format
employed, and does its rate of employment vary over time? If it is
indeed bereft of its historic condiments, does the per curiam opinion play
a viable role in current jurisprudential communication?
Such answers as are discoverable might best be sought within the
confines of a single jurisdiction and focusing upon the practices of a
particular appellate court.
III.
A.

IN GEORGIA

Preliminary

1. Method. The computer reveals that the phrase "per curiam"
appears in thousands of the Georgia Supreme Court's opinions.3" This
vast volume of references obviously dictated a measure of selectivity, an
approach for locating illustrative cases appropriate for study. The
method (arbitrarily) formulated simply focused upon groups of cases
decided at more or less regular intervals across the span of the relevant
judicial activity. Although constituting but a minuscule proportion of
the whole, those selections nonetheless offer a revealing perspective on
the Georgia Supreme Court's experience with the per curiam opinion.37
The identified case clusters appeared across the following span: (1) a
group of 100 cites starting in 1846 and counting forward; (2) a group of
100 cites starting in 1910; (3) a group of 100 cites starting in 1950; (4)
a group of 100 cites starting in 1980; and (5) a group of 100 cites
starting in 2000 and counting backwards. These groupings thus
produced a total of 500 citations to "per curiam" references by the
Georgia Supreme Court. They reveal the court's earliest 100 cites, its
most recent 100 cites, and three clusters of 100 cites each at selected

36. For suffering my numerous requests and conducting all computer searches treated
in this study, I am deeply grateful for the patience, the industry, and the enduring
kindness of Ms. Carol Watson, the University of Georgia Law Library's "Reference/Computing Services Librarian." She, of course, bears no responsibility for my
treatment of those search results.
37. Although minuscule in proportion, the total selected cases constituted a sizeable
corpus for consideration.
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intervening junctures.38 In this fashion, the study provides a highly
relevant and continuing chronicle of the court's per curiam usages.
2. Frequency Facets. A strikingly instructive initial revelation
about those usages concerned their rates of frequency; i.e., the period of
time covered by each of the randomly selected 100-case clusters. Thus,
the first 100 cases ran from 1846 to 1892,"9 a period of roughly 46
years. The second 100 cases appeared between 1910 and 1916, 40 a
period of roughly 6 years. The third 100-case cluster extended from
1950 to 1973,41 a period of roughly 23 years. The fourth 100 cases
began in 1980 and reached to mid-1981, 42 roughly 1.5 years. The final
100 cases ran from 1998 into 2000, 43 another period of roughly 1.5
years.
These are impressive findings: They reflect that the supreme court's
per curiam utilizations have increased markedly over time. At the
inception of its practice, the court required a period of 46 years to
accumulate a total of 100 per curiam references. Currently, the findings
portray, 100 per curiam references occur in less than 2 years. Finally,
the total number of years consumed by all the case clusters is likewise
noteworthy. The five groups of cases totaled a period of, roughly, 78
years. Of per curiam's 154-year history (from 1846 to 2000) in the
Georgia Supreme Court, the study directly touches 78 of those years.
That period of assessment assures a realistic profile of Georgia's per
curiam experience.
TABLE 1.

The Georgia Per Curiam Sample Scenario

No. of Citations
100

Totals:

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Years Covered
1846-1892

No. of Years
46

100

1910-1916

6

100

1950-1973

23

100
100

1980-1981
1998-2000

1.5
1.5

500 cases

Each of the 500 cases required individual examination and analysis.
June 1846 to January 1892.
January 1910 to February 1916.
June 1950 to October 1973.
January 1980 to April 1981.
October 1998 to May 2000.

78 years
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3. Points of Ponder. As earlier observed, considerable conflict
arises over the actual and perceived characteristics of the per curiam
judicial opinion. Any study of the famous format, therefore, should
acknowledge that conflict and attempt, at least, to place it in context.
Such an effort requires attention to a number of analytical features in
each of the scrutinized case groupings. Recurring reference to those
features provides a degree of the uniformity prerequisite to meaningful
comparative assessment.
What is the litigational context (civil, criminal, other) in which the
Georgia Supreme Court typically employs the per curiam style of
presentation?" Does utilization of the format most often result in
affirming or reversing the actions under review?4" Is the style reserved
for the court's unanimous decisions, or can it accommodate dissenting
opinions?4" Does the per curiam author remain anonymous, or are
there occasions for identification?47 If per curiam resolution is (as often
characterized) "adjudication without opinion," then what form of
elaboration (memorandum, opinion, headnote, other) does the pronouncement assume?4" Are per curiam utilizations more likely to resolve
procedural or substantive aspects of the case?49 These are all points for
ponder in each of the dissected case groupings.
B.

Georgia Supreme Court Per Curiams: FirstSample (1846-1892)
From the first 100-case cluster of per curiam references, 7 cases were
excluded from consideration. Those cases, rather than featuring per
curiam opinions, simply referred to other cases containing such opinions.
This "first sample" of per curiams, therefore, focuses upon a total of 93
cases.

44. Whether a case constitutes a civil proceeding or a criminal prosecution is objective
in nature and yields a definite conclusion.
45. Whether the appellate court affirms or reverses the actions below is generally
capable of objective determination, and such an inquiry yields a definite conclusion.
46. Whether the opinion is a unanimous one or subject to dissenting opinions can be
objectively determined and reported.
47. Whether authorship of the opinion is stated can be objectively determined and
reported.
48. The answer to this inquiry can be somewhat subjective. For example, the difference
between an "opinion" and a "memorandum" is one of degree (length of opinion, discussion
of issue, extent of proffered analysis, etc.), and the matter is sometimes open to
interpretation.
49. "Procedural" and "substantive" are also interpretative terms, and some amount of
subjectivity may color the classification.
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The Georgia Supreme Court's first per curiam opinion appeared in
1846, in the initial volume of its official reports. 50 The report described
the litigation as a "claim case," a levy upon defendant's property for rent
and involving the validity of a sale.5 The report's style featured an
anonymously formulated statement of the facts, a description of the
jury's verdict, three "headnote" principles of law, 2 and the names of the
respective attorneys.13 Finally, there appeared the words "PerCuriam,"
followed by a single paragraph stating that prior named decisions
controlled the resolution, that the trial judge committed
error in his
54
charge, and that a new trial would be forthcoming.
This initial per curiam venture by the supreme court thus illumined
the previously formulated six "points for ponder" in the following
fashions: Its litigational context was "civil" in nature rather than
"criminal"; it operated to reverse, rather than to affirm, the actions
under review; the court was unanimous in its decision; the author of the
disposition remained anonymous; the elaboration assumed the form of
a memorandum rather than a more extensive opinion; and the decision
turned upon substantive, rather than procedural, legal principles. Only
time would tell whether these per curiam results would also characterize
cases of the ensuing 46 years.
A review of those ensuing years not only captures the crucial
characteristics, but also imposes a distinctive "first sample" imprint upon
Georgia's per curiam profile. Although taking liberties in both simplifying and summarizing, the review's tabulated results suggest an
emerging mosaic of intriguing proportions.
First, on the point of litigation context, the supreme court's first 93 per
curiam exercises remained overwhelmingly "civil." Only nine of the
cases assumed a "criminal" complexion.

50. George S. Cameron & Co. v. Scudder, 1 Ga. 204 (1846).
51. Id. at 204.
52. These were in the form of the traditional West Publishing Co. "Keynotes."
53. 1 Ga. at 205.
54. Id. at 204-05. The following constituted the entire elaboration:
Per Curiam.
This case comes fully within the principles of the cases of Eastman and
Philbrick vs. McAlpin; and of John E. Davis and others vs. George W. Anderson
and Brother, decided at the present term of this court. For the reasons given in
those cases, to which the learned reader is referred, it is considered and adjudged,
that there was error in the charge of the court below, that a bona fide sale by an
insolvent debtor, to a creditor for a pre-existing debt, is void under the act of 1818.
Let a new trial be awarded.
Id. at 205.
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Second, as for the per curiam's operation upon the actions under
review, reversals occupied a distinctly minority position. Thus, in 71 of
the total 93 scrutinized cases, the supreme court's resolution affirmed
the lower court's disposition of the matter.
Third, the most resounding message of the "first sample" review
confirmed the status of the per curiam position in the case as one of
complete unanimity. Not a single dissenting opinion marred any of the
93 per curiam dispositions of the period. In its original appearance,
therefore, the historic format signaled complete concurrence among the
supreme court's justices. As introduced, Georgia's per curiam stance
exuded a position of zero tolerance for judicial disagreement.
Fourth, despite the previously recounted dictionary emphasis upon per
curiam's author anonymity and the absence of personal attribution,
Georgia's initial embrace of the format stood in dramatic refutation.
Study of the "first sample" 93-case cluster revealed a total of 13
instances in which the justice who authored the per curiam was
identified.55 Unaccountably, it appeared, Georgia perceived no necessary inconsistency between a presentation style at odds with personally
ascribed judicial opinions and the identification of the per curiam's
No proffered explanation of the seeming enigma was forthcomauthor.
,
ing.5
Fifth, the extent to which the per curiam elaborated its position varied
considerably over the course of the "first sample" period. Although the
classification exercise is largely one of degree, it was possible to
distinguish 19 "memoranda" during the period from 12 "opinions."57 By

55. Cases were classified "anonymous" when no justice's name appeared in either the
statement of the facts of the case or in connection with the stated "percuriam" opinion.
As for the cases classified "identified," the attributions were effected in various ways. For
example, the report of Nicholson v. State, 2 Ga. 363 (1847), sets out preliminary
information, headnotes, and then the following: "By the Court-Lumpkin, J., delivering the
opinion." Id. at 363. Later in the report, the phrase "per curiam" appears when the
judgment is announced. Id. at 365. For a different "identified" style, see Carey v. Rice, 2
Ga. 408 (1847), in which the report of the case begins with headnotes, followed by a
description of the facts, and finally: "Per Curiam-Warner, J., delivering the opinion." Id.
at 408-09. Again, see Pendergrast v. Gullatt, 10 Ga. 218 (1851), in which the report
originates with headnotes, then a statement of the facts of the case, then: "By the
Court-Lumpkin, J., delivering the opinion." Id. at 218-21. At the conclusion of the
opinion, there is the phrase "Per Curiam-Judgment affirmed." Id. at 225.
56. Perhaps the individual justices of that day simply determined from case to case the
format in which they would deliver their opinions.
57. For an example of the "memorandum" classification, see Psalmonds v. Barksdale,
3 Ga. 584 (1847), in which the report originates with a headnote and then concludes as
follows: "PER CURIAM. It is ordered by the Court, that the above cause be dismissed,
upon the ground of non joinder in the writ of error of the security on appeal." Id. at 584.
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far the most popular form of the era, however, consisted of a "Syllabus
by the Court." Indeed, in a total of 62 instances, this self-characterized
"syllabus" elaboration, typically more extensive than either the
"memorandum" or the "opinion," carried the case.5" The Georgia
Supreme Court apparently abhorred complete subscription to the
"adjudication without opinion" description of the per curiam format.
Sixth, the "procedural-substantive" distinction represents yet another
quandary of interpretation. An effort to exercise that discretion as
prudently as possible, however, yielded a fairly clear determination. In
a sizable majority of the scrutinized instances (by a margin of 69 to 24),
the supreme court's earliest per curiam opinions served to resolve
substantive aspects of the cases.
TABLE II.

Georgia Per Curiams: First Sample (93 Cases)

Ponder Point
Context:
(1)
Civil
Criminal
Disposition:
(2)
Affirm
Reverse
Unanimity:
(3)
Unanimous
Dissents
Authorship:
(4)
Anonymous
Identified
Elaboration:
(5)

(6)

Number

Percentage

84
9

90%
10%

71
22

76%
24%

93
0

100%
0%

80
13

86%
14%

Opinion

12

13%

Memorandum

19

20%

62

67%

Procedural

24

26%

Substantive

69

74%

Syllabus
Principle:

For an instance of the "opinion" classification, see Weathers v. Doster, 6 Ga. 227 (1849), in
which the report first sets out the headnotes and then the phrase "Per Curiam." There
then follows a two-paragraph discussion that explains the issue and gives a prior case as
authority for the conclusion. Id. at 227-28.
58. For an example of the "syllabus" classification, see Franklin v. State, 85 Ga. 570,
11 S.E. 876 (1890), in which the report originates with a syllabus by the court. There then
appears a statement of the facts of the case under which there appears both an opinion and
an announcement of the judgment. For a different style, see Gregory v. Gray, 88 Ga. 172,
14 S.E. 187 (1891), which originates with a syllabus by the court, in the form of headnotes,
followed by a description of the case. Id. at 172-74, 14 S.E. at 187-88.
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Georgia Supreme Court Per Curiams: Second Sample (1910-1916)

The study's second sample time line moved to the conclusion of the
first decade in the new century. Remarkably, no exclusions from this
sample were necessary, for each of the selected cases featured a per
curiam opinion. This treatment of "second sample" per curiams,
therefore, focuses upon a total of 100 cases.
A review of these early-1900 case reports serves not only to confirm
previously noted impressions, but also to mark several intriguing
modifications. Both endeavors add significantly to the Georgia Supreme
Court's tentative but developing per curiam jurisprudence.
First, the court's earlier proclivity for adopting the per curiam
presentation style primarily in the civil context continued apace. Of the
100 adoptions reviewed at the second juncture, only 10 occurred in the
domain of criminal law. Per curiam's special affinity for civil dispositions thus maintained a striking presence in the Georgia corpus.
Second, likewise consistent with the findings of the initial sample, the
per curiam opinion affirmed actions under review markedly more often
than it overturned them. By a division of 74 to 26, the decisions of the
second 100-case cluster upheld the lower court judgments on appeal. 9
As earlier conjectured, summary disposition may indeed coalesce more
completely with an approving appellate demeanor.
Third, in a dynamic digression from the impressive pattern of first
segment cases, the per curiams of the second sample no longer attained
total judicial unanimity. Although the great majority (86 of 100) of per
curiam opinions still spoke for the entire court, two glaring exceptional
practices now emerged. First, in a total of 10 cases, the supreme court
employed per curiam opinions to announce that its full bench of six
justices was evenly divided on the issue under review. 6° Such equal

59. Actually, one of the decisions counted as "affirm" consisted of the supreme court's
instructions to the court of appeals.
60. For an example, see Rogers v. Brand, 133 Ga. 759, 66 S.E. 1095 (1910), in which
the entire opinion (following one headnote) consists of the following:
Per Curiam. This case came before this court upon a writ of error, and the same
being for decision by a full bench of six Justices, who are evenly divided in
opinion, Chief Justice Fish, Presiding Justice Evans, and Justice Lumpkin being
in favor of a reversal, and Justices Beck, Atkinson, and Holden being in favor of
affirmance, it is considered and adjudged that the judgment of the court below
stand affirmed by operation of law.
Id. at 759, 66 S.E. at 1095-96.
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divisions, "by operation of law," affirmed the lower courts' judgments.
In an ironic overthrow of per curiam's historic connotations of oneness,
solidarity, and total concurrence, therefore, the format now found service
in proclaiming polarizing factionalism and paralyzing dissension. The
other digression was equally conclusive in reversing history. In 4 cases
of the second sample, a per curiam opinion was followed by an explicitly
styled "dissenting opinion." The dissent, moreover, carried the identification of the dissenting justice.6 1 Once again, the staple characteristic
of anonymous solidarity experienced rather traumatic rejection.
Fourth, as for the authorship of per curiam opinions themselves, the
cases of the scrutinized period followed the questionable lead of initial
practices. In a total of 10 instances, the report clearly identified each
justice in the case and revealed his judgment on the issue presented. 2
Once again, Georgia perceived no necessary connection between a noattribution format and a lack of anonymity.
Fifth, the elaboration practices of the second 100-case sample served
to continue, even to accelerate, previously observed tendencies. Once
again, both "opinion" and "memorandum" forms of expression appeared
throughout the cases of the period under scrutiny. The overwhelming
medium of per curiam communication remained, however, the "syllabus"
presentation. Indeed, 85 of the 100 cases surveyed included the per
curiam statement as a part of the self-styled "Syllabus by the Court."
Sixth, likewise confirming the indications of the initial sample, the per
curiams of the early 1900s resolved, by a considerable majority,
"substantive" issues in the reported cases. Although a somewhat
subjective exercise, the "procedural" designation applied clearly to only
22 of the second sample's per curiam resolutions. 3

61. For an example, see Western & A. R.R. v. Kinnamon, 134 Ga. 217, 67 S.E. 799
(1910), in which, after the phrase "per curiam" and the announced judgment in the case,
there appeared the following: "Beck, J., dissenting." Id. at 217-18, 67 S.E. at 799 (Beck,
J., dissenting). "Being of the opinion that the charge complained of was authorized by the
evidence, and that it was adapted to that portion of the evidence to which it relates, I
dissent from the opinion of the majority of the court." Id. at 218, 67 S.E. at 799.
62. These were the 10 cases referred to above, in which the report employed a per
curiam opinion to announce that the court was evenly divided and to list the justices and
their respective positions. Although the per curiam itself was not signed, the judgments
of all the justices were clearly revealed.
63. That, of course, left a total of 78 per curiam opinions that appeared to resolve
substantive issues presented in the subject cases.
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TABLE III. Georgia Per Curiams: Second Sample (100 Cases)
Ponder Point
Number
Percentage
(1)
Context:
Civil
90
90%
Criminal
10
10%
(2)
Disposition:
Affirm
74
74%
Reverse
26
26%
(3)
Unanimity:
Unanimous
86
86%
Dissents
4
4%
Divided
10
10%
(4)
Authorship:
Anonymous
90
90%
Identified
10
10%
(5)
Elaboration:
Opinion
2
2%
Memorandum
13
13%
Syllabus
85
85%
(6)
Principle:
Procedural
22
22%
Substantive
78
78%

D.

Georgia Supreme Court Per Curiams: Third Sample (1950-1973)

From the third 100 cites to "per curiam" references, it was necessary
to extract 5 cases not actually featuring per curiam opinions. 4 This
"third sample," therefore, includes a total of 95 material cases, cases
decided during the third quarter of the twentieth century. 5 Their
results serve both to reaffirm and to reorder previously observed
phenomena.
First, one instructive facet of this sample pointed to an increased
prominence of criminal cases. Thus, criminal cases receiving per curiam
disposition more than doubled in number from each of the first two
scrutinized periods. Indeed, the percentage of criminal context per
curiams in this third sample exceeded the total of those rendered in both

64. The opinions in those 5 cases only referred to other per curiam decisions.
65. The first tabulated case of this third 100-case cluster was decided in June 1950, and
the last case of the survey period was decided in October 1973.
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prior periods. For no explicated reason, the supreme court added
substantially to its per curiam presence in criminal proceedings.
Second, another significant manifestation of the period was the notable
decrease in per curiam affirmances, a drop from approximately 75% in
each of the first two periods to roughly 60%. This decrease resulted, in
turn, from two other developments. In a number of instances, the
supreme court employed the per curiam format merely to transfer
certain cases to the court of appeals. More importantly, the court
markedly increased its number of per curiam reversals. In each of the
first two study periods, per curiam reversals stood at roughly 25%;
during the present period, those reversals rose to 36%. The implications
from those findings may weaken the theory that clear, simple, unelaborated dispositions should most logically be expected when the court
affirms the actions under review.
Third, the truly revolutionary revelation from the third 100-case
cluster portrayed per curiam's fervent embrace of the dissenting opinion.
From. a presence of 0% in the first sample, to one of 10% in the second,
dissenting opinions during the third period appeared in 56% of the
court's per curiam cases. The manifested disagreement, moreover,
frequently operated at its most severe level; i.e., the per curiam opinion
would express the judgment of four justices only to be immediately
followed by a three-justice dissent.66 The dissension ravaged the court
not only in its per curiam dispositions of cases on the merits, but also in
its per curiam decisions on the propriety of granting certiorari.67 Per
curiam's conventional connotation of consensus appeared reduced to
shambles.
Fourth, although the great majority of per curiams remained anonymous, a small persistent percentage of identified opinions maintained a
presence throughout the third case sample.
Fifth, the "syllabus" format of per curiam elaboration, introduced so
forcefully by the cases of the second survey period, continued its
dominating presence.6s Although "opinions," "memoranda," and even

66. For an illustrative case appearing relatively early in the third survey period, see
Jackson v. Jackson, 209 Ga. 85, 70 S.E.2d 592 (1952); for an illustrative case appearing
relatively late in the period, see Morgan v. Reeves, 226 Ga. 697, 177 S.E.2d 68 (1970).
67. For an illustrative case appearing relatively early in the third survey period, see
Wedner & Roberts, Inc. v. Jones, 213 Ga. 375, 99 S.E.2d 142 (1957); for an illustrative case
appearing relatively late in the period, see Law v. State, 226 Ga. 591, 176 S.E.2d 80 (1970).
68. Additionally, the lengths of the syllabus opinions appeared to increase during this
third survey period, thus, leading to further deterioration of the practical distinction
between per curiams and regular opinions.
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"headnotes" occasionally served the cause, they played a distinctly minor
role as alternative forms of presentation.
Sixth, again, a clear majority of per curiam resolutions could be
identified as substantive in nature. This could not disguise the fact,
however, that procedural issues constituted the objects of attention in an
increasing number of cases. Indeed, those instances rose from 26% and
22%, respectively, in previous periods, to an impressive 38% of the third
100-case cluster.
TABLE IV. Georgia Per Curiams: Third Sample (95 Cases)
Ponder Point
Number
Percentage
(1)
Context:
Civil
70
74%
Criminal
25
26%
(2)
Disposition:
Affirm
56
60%
Transfer
5
5%
Reverse
34
35%
(3)
Unanimity:
Unanimous
39
41%
Dissents
56
59%
(4)
Authorship:
Anonymous
88
93%
Identified
7
7%
(5)
Elaboration:
Opinion
8
8%
Headnote
7
7%
Memorandum
5
5%
Syllabus
75
79%
(6)
Principle:
Procedural
36
38%
Substantive
59
62%

E.

Georgia Supreme Court Per Curiams: Fourth Sample (1980-1981)

A stunning feature of the fourth sample revealed the breathtaking
rapidity with which the Georgia Supreme Court rendered 100 per curiam
opinions. In a record period of approximately 1.5 years, 9 the court

69. The fourth sample period began with a case decided on January 3, 1980 and ended
with a case decided on April 21, 1981.
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accomplished what had previously required, respectively, 46 years, 6
years, and 23 years. Truly, the historic per curiam format, sometimes
considered a relic of antiquity, had claimed center-stage prominence in
Georgia's modern jurisprudence.
Only one of the fourth sample references was excluded for reasons of
immateriality," leaving a total of 99 cases for analytical review. When
evaluated via the characteristics here studied, those cases assist
significantly in refining the profile in progress.
First, as previously, the court's "civil" per curiam dispositions (65%)
considerably outnumbered its per curiam treatments of "criminal" cases
(13%). The fourth sample offerings also revealed, however, that the two
traditional designations no longer sufficed to account for all the supreme
court's per curiam activity. For the first time in the historical route here
traced, legal "disciplinary" determinations claimed an insistent status on
the court's agenda. Whether "disbarments," "suspensions," "reprimands,"
or "certifications," the supreme court found itself immersed in regulation
of the bar's professional ethics. Impressively, when confronted with this
crucial and sensitive responsibility, the court selected as its primary tool
of presentation the fabled format of the per curiam opinion. Indeed,
during the fourth sample's extremely brief period of coverage, 23% of the
supreme court's per curiam volume consisted of disciplinary determinations. The "anachronism" found service, therefore, in an astonishingly
modern venue.
Second, new developments also registered a demonstrative impact
upon the characteristic of "disposition." For example, there appeared
during the fourth sample survey a considerable number of domestic
relations cases in which the court summarily dismissed appeals for
improper procedures." Those dismissals are included in the period's
per curiam affirmances (63%). Additionally, per curiam reversals
declined from the third period to a total of 15%. As for the remaining
23% of per curiam dispositions, these, once again, represent the court's
disciplinary determinations. Classified as neither "affirmances" nor
"reversals," this disciplinary total featured "suspensions" (13%),
"disbarments" (3%), "reprimands" (6%), and "certifications" (1%).

70. That case merely referred to a per curiam opinion in another case.
71. For example, see Zusmann v. Zusmann., 246 Ga. 341, 272 S.E.2d 75 (1980): "Per
Curiam. Appellant has not followed the appeal procedures required by law in domestic
relations cases. Appeal dismissed. All the Justices concur." Id. at 341, 272 S.E.2d at 75
(citations omitted).
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Third, a majority (69%) of the per curiam judgments delivered during
the fourth survey period reflected the support of a unanimous court.
Although this facet restored a semblance of order to the remarkable
"dissent revolution" highlighted in the previous period, it by no means
brought that phenomenon to a stable conclusion. The fact that 31% of
the fourth sample per curiams still drew opposition by dissenting
opinions stood as stark testimony of the Georgia per curiam's consensus
crises.
Fourth, yet another fourth-sample revelation pivoted on the point of
anonymity. For the first time in the entire study, not a single per
curiam opinion rendered by the supreme court carried an indication of
authorship.
Finally, perhaps, Georgia reflected
the conceptual
irreconcilability of the per curiam format with the personally ascribed
judicial opinion.
Fifth, the fourth-sample survey period registered a monumental shift
in the form of per curiam elaboration. Suddenly, according to the selfstyled offerings of the case reports themselves, the "syllabus" format
abruptly terminated. Departing from the form that had overwhelmingly
dominated all three previous study periods, per curiams of the fourth
sample divided between "opinions" and "memoranda." A majority (56%)
of the dispositions not only assumed the mantle of "opinions," but also
proffered full fledged elaborations that, had they carried an author's
signature, would have been virtually indistinguishable from regular
judicial opinions. The remaining 44% of presentations subscribed to the
"memorandum" format.
Sixth, once again, the per curiam dispositions of "substantive" issues
considerably exceeded (by a division of 65% to 32%) those perceived as
"procedural." Moreover, it was this fourth sample period that first
reflected the court's practice of employing the per curiam format to
Although this
"affirm[] without opinion pursuant to Rule 59. "72
summary practice accounted for only 3% of the cases, it appeared
sufficiently distinctive to warrant separate classification.

72. McZorn v. Taylor, 246 Ga. 307, 271 S.E.2d 218 (1980). "Per Curiam. Judgment
affirmed without opinion pursuant to Rule 59. All the Justices concur." Rule 59 reads as
follows:
"Affirmance without opinion may be rendered when the court determines one or
more of the following circumstances exists and is dispositive of the appeal:
(1) The evidence supports the judgment;
(2) No harmful error of law, properly raised and requiring reversal, appears;
(3) The judgment of the court below adequately explains the decision and an
opinion would have no precedential value."
GA. SUP. CT. R. 59.
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TABLE V. Georgia Per Curiams: Fourth Sample (99 Cases)
Ponder Point
Number
Percentage
(1)
Context:
Civil
63
65%
Criminal
13
13%
Disciplinary
23
23%
(2)
Disposition:
Affirm
61
63%
Reverse
15
15%
Disciplinary
23
23%
(3)

Unanimity:

Unanimous
Dissents
(4)

(5)

F

69%
31%

99
0

100%
0%

Authorship:

Anonymous
Identified
Elaboration:
Opinion
Memorandum

(6)

68
31

Principle:
Procedural
Substantive
Rule 59

55

56%

44

44%

32
64
3

32%
65%
3%

Georgia Supreme Court Per Curiams: Fifth Sample (1998-2000)

In order to obtain the supreme court's latest 100 per curiam references, selection began in 2000 and proceeded backwards to capture the
necessary number of cases. This search process required a period of
precisely 19 months to produce the desired results.73 The fifth sample's
per curiam coverage thus ranges from October 1998 through May 2000,
not only conferring currency upon the study but also confirming the
astounding per curiam volume exposed by the preceding survey period.
The vintage format, it turns out, truly does retain startling popularity
with Georgia's highest appellate tribunal.
Only 3 cases required elimination from the corpus for reasons of
immateriality, 4 leaving a total of 97 decisions as the fifth sample's

73. Beginning with a case decided on May 30, 2000, the search had produced a total
of 100 per curiam references by the Georgia Supreme Court when it reached a case decided
on October 13, 1998.
74. These cases simply referred to other per curiam decisions and did not themselves
render per curiam opinions.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

frame of reference. From this sample, the mosaic's concluding configurations emerge.
First, the survey period revealed two remarkable developments
regarding "context." For the first time, the sample registered no
criminal cases. Although never commanding an overwhelming presence
in the per curiam montage, traditionally ranging, however, from 10% to
25% of the total, the criminal case's complete disappearance from the
scene marked a major occurrence of the study. In addition, the sample
reflected almost total domination by the disciplinary determination.
Having gained an initial foothold (23%) during the fourth survey period,
per curiam treatments of lawyer discipline soared to a total of 90% in
the fifth sample. Indeed, legal ethics determinations appeared poised to
assume a position virtually synonymous with per curiam itself. In terms
of both popularity and context, therefore, the per curiam opinion could
scarcely hold a higher profile in the Georgia Supreme Court.
Second, per curiam's disciplinary explosion also overwhelmed the
"disposition" determinant. For the only time in the entire study, not a
single per curiam opinion operated to reverse the actions under review.
From a position averaging 25% of the total across the first four survey
periods, reversals dropped off the screen in the fifth sample. Even the
sample's affirmances barely registered: They consisted of 10 civil cases
in which the supreme court affirmed judgment without opinion under
"Rule 59. "75 Once again the documented decline was dramatic: From
a position averaging 68% of the total across the first four survey periods,
per curiam affirmances plummeted to 10% in the fifth sample.
Obviously, then, the sample's dispositions consisted primarily of the
supreme court's disciplinary determinations. Indeed, those determinations accounted for 90% of the court's entire per curiam output,
composed of the following denominations: disbarments (43%), suspensions (37%), certifications (4%), bar exam status (3%), and reinstatements (2%). In the Georgia Supreme Court's current jurisprudence,
therefore, "discipline" equals "per curiam," and, increasingly, "per
curiam" equals "discipline."
Third, although 89% of the period's per curiam opinions spoke for a
unanimous court, the remaining opinions drew dissents.7 6 Accordingly,
the previously emphasized dichotomy, although lessened to 11% of the
cases, continued into the fifth sample.

75. See, e.g., Portman v. Ingram, No. S99A0440, 1999 WL 198279 (Ga. Apr. 12, 1999)
(unpublished opinion): "Per Curiam. The judgment of the court below is affirmed without
opinion pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 59. All the Justices concur." Id. at *1.
76. Dissents occurred both in the disciplinary decisions and in the "Rule 59"
affirmances.
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Fourth, the fifth sample cases followed those of the fourth in
registering only anonymous opinions. Once again, therefore, not a single
per curiam opinion indicated its personal source of origin.
Fifth, the court's fifth-sample per curiam dispositions continued the
previously evidenced revolt against "syllabus" elaborations and opted
instead for "opinions" and "memoranda." The court employed "opinions"
in its disciplinary endeavors: Most of those efforts were fairly brief but
with an occasional exception. The "memorandum" constituted the court's
method of handling its affirmances under "Rule 59."
Sixth, the pervading distinction between the discipline determinations
and the summary affirmances also controlled classification of per
curiam'sprinciples during the fifth sample. The disciplinary dispositions
were deemed "substantive" in nature; the "Rule 59" cases again
accounted for a separate category; and "procedural" principles failed to
register.
TABLE VI. Georgia Per Curiams: Fifth Sample (97 Cases)
Ponder Point
Number
Percentage
(1)
Context:
Civil
10
10%
Criminal
0
0%
Disciplinary
87
90%
(2)
Disposition:
Affirm
10
10%
Reverse
0
0%
Disciplinary
87
90%
(3)
Unanimity:
Unanimous
86
89%
Dissents
11
11%
(4)
Authorship:
Anonymous
97
100%
Identified
0
0%
(5)
Elaboration:
Opinion
87
90%
Memorandum
10
10%
(6)
Principle:
Procedural
0
0%
Substantive
87
90%
Rule 59
10
10%
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G. A Compendium of the Composites
The preceding synopses chronicle the Georgia Supreme Court's use of
the per curiam opinion over the past 154 years. They describe findings
ferreted from five samples, each sample focusing upon 100 cases in
which the court referred to the per curiam technique. In most, the court
actually issued a per curiam opinion to resolve the litigation. The
samples feature both the earliest and the most current of the court's per
curiam endeavors, as well as strategically selected case clusters
spanning the intervening years. In this fashion, the scrutinized
selections accomplish two remarkable feats of coverage. First, they
touch a total of 500 cases decided in 78 of the 154 years under review.
Second, they treat per curiam opinions delivered by the supreme court
during three different centuries. An analytical range of those proportions
assures a temporal perspective both complete and current.
Training that perspective upon per curiam's traditional vagaries
requires several brief inquiries into each cluster of cases. Although
somewhat tedious in execution, those recurring references provide
meaningful comparative appraisal. They also assist in assessing the
historic controversy surrounding the per curiam opinion. Having
presented a composite of the results extracted from each case sample,
perhaps a compendium of those composites, inquiry by inquiry, might
helpfully position the Georgia experience.
1. Context. Initially, the surveys sought to identify the precise
litigation context in which the supreme court typically employed the per
curiam style of presentation. This "context" anthology revealed a
characteristic perpetually in motion. As it originated and traditionally
operated, Georgia per curiam primarily treated the lawsuit of civil
complexion. The criminal case, in contrast, maintained a low per curiam
profile in early years, peaked in the 1950-1973 case cluster, and
gradually disappeared from view. Currently, both civil and criminal
contexts have suffered complete domination by the court's increasingly
active role in monitoring legal ethics. "Context" thus remains a per
curiam characteristic warranting close attention in the immediate
future.
Table VII. Per Curiam's Context (1846-2000)
1st Sample 2nd Sample 3rd Sample 4th Sample
1846-1892
1910-1916
1950-1973
1980-1981
Civil
Criminal
Disciplinary

90%
10%
0%

90%
10%
0%

74%
26%
0%

65%
13%
23%

5th Sample
1998-2000
10%
0%
90%
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2. Disposition. Another shaping inquiry focused upon per curiam's
substantive results in the cases. Did the supreme court's adoption of the
famous format traditionally foretell a decision to affirm, reverse, or treat
in some other manner, the actions under review? The sampled instances
unfolded a performance that, until present practices, accorded with
logical expectations. Over the years, by a roughly calculated ratio of
three to one, the per curiam opinion affirmed, rather than reversed, the
actions appealed. However, the court's modern per curiam preoccupation
with lawyer discipline has drastically impacted this facet as well. Those
disciplinary determinations, classified as neither "affirmances" nor
"reversals," currently account for 90% of the court's entire per curiam
output.
TABLE VIII.
1st Sample
1846-1892
76%
Affirm
Reverse
24%
Transfer
0%
Disciplinary
0%

Per Curiam's Dispositions (1846-2000)
2nd Sample
1910-1916
74%
26%
0%
0%

3rd Sample
1950-1973
60%
35%
5%
0%

4th Sample
1980-1981
63%
15%
0%
23%

5th Sample
1998-2000
10%
0%
0%
90%

3. Unanimity. A third recurring question plumbed the extent to
which Georgia practice mirrored per curiam's dictionary definition as an
opinion by the court rather than by a judge. More specifically, could the
per curiam format accommodate a dissenting opinion? Initially, the
response was resoundingly negative. As introduced and instituted,
Georgia's per curiam disposition signaled complete concurrence among
the supreme court's justices, and no dissenting opinions marred that
unanimity. This position relented in the early 1900s, however, and midtwentieth century samples revealed a striking presence of dissenting
opinions in a majority of the court's per curiam cases. Although modern
surveys depict moderation of the conceptual revolt, they nevertheless
attest to per curiam's continued toleration of at least some expressed
judicial dissension.
Table IX. Per Curiam's Unanimity (1846-2000)
st Sample 2nd Sample 3rd Sample 4th Sample
1980-1981
1846-1892
1910-1916
1950-1973
100%
86%
41%
69%
Unanimous
0%
4%
59%
31%
Dissents
0%
0%
Divided
0%
10%

5th Sample
1998-2000
89%
11%
0%
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4. Authorship. Georgia's original embrace of the per curiam format
intriguingly refuted conventional emphasis upon the absence of personal
attribution. Perceiving no necessary connection between a no-attribution
technique and a lack of anonymity, a healthy minority of Georgia cases
identified the authors of per curiam opinions. Indeed, the samples
reveal, only in the last twenty years have such attributions ceased so as
to reflect a conceptional conflict between the per curiam format and the
personally ascribed judicial opinion.
Table X. Per Curiam's Authorship (1846-2000)
1st Sample 2nd Sample 3rd Sample 4th Sample 5th Sample
1846-1892 1910-1916
1950-1973 1980-1981 1998-2000
Anonymous
86%
90%
93%
100%
100%
Identified
14%
10%
7%
0%
0%
5. Elaboration. Rejecting per curiam's "adjudication without
opinion" connotation, the supreme court originally couched its per
curiam formulation in a "Syllabus by the Court." This elaboration, more
extensive than the alternative forms of "memoranda" and "opinions,"
held dominating presence throughout much of Georgia's per curiam
history. That presence abruptly terminated in recent years, however,
and the alternative styles prevailed. Presently, the court employs what
closely resembles an "opinion" to elaborate its disciplinary determinations and a considerably more succinct "memorandum" to effectuate its
"Rule 59" affirmances. Although the classification efforts themselves
exude considerable subjectivity, it is clear that per curiam's form of
elaboration has varied vigorously across the centuries.
Table XI. Per Curiam's Elaboration (1846-2000)
1st Sample 2nd Sample 3rd Sample 4th Sample 5th Sample
1846-1892 1910-1916
1950-1973 1980-1981 1998-2000
Opinion
13%
2%
8%
56%
90%
Memorandum
20%
13%
5%
44%
10%
Syllabus
67%
85%
79%
0%
0%
Headnote

0%

0%

7%

0%

0%

6. Principle. A final monitored facet of the study sought to
determine whether Georgia's per curiam utilizations resolved "procedural" principles in the cases more frequently than "substantive" ones.
Although the distinction itself resides in the eye of the beholder, fairly
clear delineations emerged throughout the samples. Consistently, review
revealed, it was the substantive principle that most often, and by a
measurable majority, received per curiam resolution. Presently, the

PER CURIAM

2000]

27

supreme court's "substantive" role in the lawyer discipline phenomenon
dwarfs its "Rule 59" dispositions.
Table XII. Per Curiam's Principle (1846-2000)
1st Sample 2nd Sample 3rd Sample 4th Sample
1980-1981
1950-1973
1910-1916
1846-1892
32%
38%
22%
26%
Procedural
65%
62%
78%
Substantive 74%
3%
0%
0%
0%
Rule 59

5th Sample
1998-2000
0%
90%
10%

IV. CONCLUSION

Among the communication forms of legal process, no "medium"
subsumes the "message" more thoroughly than the per curiam judicial
opinion. When an appellate court delivers its judgment "percuriam," it

employs a format of legendary status, a format as vague, however, as it
is familiar. The Latinism derives from an English heritage both praised
as "intellectually honest"77 and condemned as "government by edict.""
Beyond superficial dictionary translations, moreover, the device remains
a subject of remarkably little work or clarification.7 9
Any sustained effort at enlightenment bears the burdens of appraising
the generalities, observing the utilizations, and attempting an assimilation. The informed performance of those endeavors requires a theater
of operation: a body of the per curiam practices historically perpetuated
by a single appellate tribunal. This brief study has focused upon those
practices in the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Essentially, the study reveals, the historic "definitions" suffer
documented default.

On occasion, the per curiam opinion is not "an

opinion by the whole court." On occasion, the per curiam statement is
not "an announced judgment unaccompanied by written opinion." On
occasion, the per curiam expression may be one "attributed to any one

member of the court."8" Further, the study exposes inherent weaknesses in the conventional per curiam connotations. "Unanimity," "solidarity," "anonymity," "succinctness," "routine," and "noncontroversial" all fail
inevitably to withstand the consuming tides of actual experience.
Finally, the study resists calculated conjectures that the per curiam
opinion most likely constitutes an affirmance, dealing perhaps with a
procedural issue, and operating perhaps in a noncriminal context.

77.
78.
79.
80.

See
See
See
See

supra note 28.
supra note 24.
supra note 18.
supra Part II.
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Again, explicated evidence undermines the confidence with which those
suppositions may be advanced.
The study also effectively responds to the more general inquiries.
First, do the circumstances ofper curiam's utilization hold constant over
the years? As tabulated, those circumstances change at a dynamic pace;
indeed, "context" proves perpetually in motion as it touches civil cases,
criminal cases, and disciplinary proceedings in historic succession.
Second, does per curiam's degree of usage vary over time? As recounted,
usage has flourished in fulsome fashion; indeed, its current velocity
reaches roughly 100 judicial references every 1.5 years. Third, what of
per curiam's role in modern jurisprudential communication?
As
graphically demonstrated, the format's vitality virtually pulsates; indeed,
its present preoccupation with lawyer discipline not only serves8 1a crucial
cause but also confirms the technique's invaluable versatility.
Long live the peculiarity of per curiam in the Georgia Supreme Court!

81. As for present practices within the Georgia Supreme Court, there are no adopted
.rules" as to when per curiam opinions will be employed, but there is an "understanding"
that they will be used in attorney discipline matters, in bar admission cases, and in "Rule
59" dispositions. Otherwise, the decision to employ a per curiam opinion for a particular
case would be made by the court in conference; no individual justice assigned to write an
opinion would make that decision. (The author gratefully acknowledges receipt of this
information via a telephone conversation with The Honorable George H. Carley, Justice,
The Supreme Court of Georgia.)

